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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.  
 
In November 1999, Wyeth L.L.C. (“Wyeth”) entered 
into a nationwide class action settlement agreement (the 
“Settlement Agreement”) with the users of certain diet drugs 
linked to various health problems.  The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified the 
settlement class and entered a pre-trial order enjoining 
members of the class from suing Wyeth for injuries related to 
those drugs.  Appellants Carmen and Ricky Leon Cauthen 
brought a lawsuit against Wyeth in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, seeking to 
redress Ms. Cauthen‟s injuries from primary pulmonary 
hypertension (“PPH”), a condition that she alleges was caused 
by the diet drugs.  Wyeth moved the District Court to enjoin 
the suit, arguing that it did not qualify under the Settlement 
Agreement as a cause of action that could proceed despite the 
settlement.  The District Court agreed and enjoined the 
Cauthens‟ lawsuit.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm.  
 
I. Background 
 
 A. Class Action Suit and Settlement Agreement 
 
Between 1994 and 1997, American Home Products 
Corporation, now Wyeth, marketed and sold fenfluramine and 
dexfenfluramine, prescription weight loss drugs.  After 
studies linked the drugs to valvular heart disease, and 
following a U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
public health advisory, Wyeth withdrew the drugs from the 
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market in 1997.  Thousands of individuals subsequently filed 
suit, alleging that they had been injured by the drugs.   
 
In December 1997, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation entered an order transferring all diet drug cases in 
federal court to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania for consolidated pre-trial 
proceedings.  Nearly two years later, Wyeth entered into a 
Settlement Agreement with users of the diet drugs in the 
United States and presented the agreement to the District 
Court for approval.  On August 28, 2000, the District Court 
certified the class, approved the Settlement Agreement, and 
entered Pre-Trial Order (“PTO”) No. 1415.  That order 
provided that the District Court “retains continuing and 
exclusive jurisdiction over this action and each of the Parties, 
including [Wyeth] and the class members, to administer, 
supervise, interpret and enforce the Settlement in accordance 
with its terms.”  (Supplemental App. at 8.)  
 
Aside from certain narrow exceptions, the Settlement 
Agreement enjoins class members from suing Wyeth for all 
diet drug-related injuries.  One of the exceptions is at issue in 
this case: the Settlement Agreement allows class members to 
sue Wyeth if they can demonstrate that they developed PPH
1
 
through the use of the diet drugs.  To qualify for the 
exception, a class member must draw on “[m]edical records” 
to demonstrate the “exclus[ion]” of certain medical 
                                              
1
 PPH is a condition that “deprives the lungs of oxygen 
[and] can cause hypoxemia and hypercapnia, resulting in 
ventilator insufficiency.”  14 Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. 
Gordy, Attorneys’ Textbook of Medicine ¶ 205.75 (3d ed. 
2011). 
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conditions.  (App. at 787-88.)  To exclude one such condition, 
which is referred to as “greater than mild restrictive lung 
disease,” a class member is required by § I.46.a(2)(c) of the 
Settlement Agreement to produce “pulmonary function tests”2 
(“PFTs”) showing that the class member‟s “total lung 
capacity” is greater than “60% of predicted at rest.”  (Id. 
(Settlement Agreement, § I.46.a(2)(c)).)  
 
 B. The Cauthens’ Lawsuit 
 
In June 2011, the Cauthens filed a complaint in the 
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that 
Ms. Cauthen, a member of the settlement class, developed 
PPH “as a result of ingesting Diet Drugs.”  (Id. at 3.)  The 
Cauthens produced a “[p]ulmonary consultation note” 
prepared by Dr. Terry Fortin (id. at 795-97), a cardiologist 
certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine.  Dr. 
Fortin stated in the consultation note that, based on a PFT she 
had conducted, Ms. Cauthen‟s “total lung capacity [is] 56%,” 
and Dr. Fortin acknowledged that Ms. Cauthen‟s lungs 
“clearly have some restriction.”  (Id. at 796.)  
 
Because Ms. Cauthen‟s only PFT showed that she had 
lung capacity of less than 60 percent of predicted at rest, 
Wyeth notified the Cauthens that they were prohibited from 
                                              
2
 “Pulmonary function tests are a group of tests that 
measure how well the lungs take in and release air and how 
well they move gases such as oxygen from the atmosphere 
into the body‟s circulation.”  Pulmonary function tests: 
MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003853.htm 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2013).   
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bringing their claim, as Ms. Cauthen did not satisfy 
§ I.46.a(2)(c) of the Settlement Agreement.  The Cauthens 
declined to drop the lawsuit.  Wyeth then filed a motion in the 
District Court seeking to enjoin the Cauthens‟ state court 
lawsuit for failing to satisfy the precondition for suit provided 
by the Settlement Agreement.  Opposing Wyeth‟s motion, the 
Cauthens submitted a declaration by Dr. Fortin stating that, 
“to a reasonable degree of medical certainty[,] … Ms. 
Cauthen has primary pulmonary hypertension secondary to 
her use of [one of the diet drugs] in early 1997.”  (Id. at 808.)  
 
In her declaration, Dr. Fortin alluded to the 
requirement in § I.46.a(2)(c) of the Settlement Agreement 
that lung capacity must be greater than 60 percent of 
predicted at rest, and she said that “[i]nsight into underlying 
pathophysiology can often be gained by comparing the 
measured values for pulmonary function tests obtained on a 
patient at any particular point with normative values derived 
from population studies.”  (Id. at 809.)  “The percentage of 
predicted normal [lung capacity],” she continued, “is used to 
grade the severity of the abnormality.”  (Id.)  She explained 
that the normative values used to calculate a patient‟s 
percentage of lung capacity predicted at rest “are based upon 
averages for persons of similar height, weight, age, ethnicity, 
etc.”  (Id.)  According to Dr. Fortin, the “standard average 
reference” used to calculate Ms. Cauthen‟s percentage of lung 
capacity was 5.37 liters, a value “taken from the Crapo/Hsu 
Duke modified guide at [Duke] University.”  (Id. at 810.)  Dr. 
Fortin further explained that, through a battery of tests 
conducted on April 28, 2009, she had determined that Ms. 
Cauthen had a lung capacity of 3.03 liters.  Dividing 3.03 
(Ms. Cauthen‟s lung capacity) by 5.37 (the average lung 
capacity of individuals matching Ms. Cauthen‟s demographic 
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profile), yields Ms. Cauthen‟s percentage of lung capacity 
predicted at rest, 56.4 percent.  
 
Dr. Fortin went on to downplay that result by 
challenging the accuracy of the denominator in the above 
equation.  The figures used to represent average lung capacity 
by demographic characteristics, she asserted, “are only 
averages and may vary in actual practice.”  (Id. at 809.)  “The 
5.37 liter reference is only a reference value,” she continued, 
“and does not actually represent M[s]. Cauthen‟s total lung 
capacity. …  [T]he 5.37 liter reference value is just a 
predicted average of [a] wom[a]n‟s total lung capacity who 
fits Ms. Cauthen‟s age, height, race and weight.”  (Id. at 810.)  
In fact, Dr. Fortin claimed, the value taken from the 
Crapo/Hsu Duke modified guide “is just one of the many 
references available that are out there.”  (Id.)  Without 
providing any other reference, Dr. Fortin concluded “to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that we just do not 
know conclusively what the true reference value for Ms. 
Cauthen should be.”  (Id.)  Dr. Fortin did offer, however, that, 
“[i]f we were to use a reference value of 5.05, just 32ccs less 
than the 5.37 reference originally used[,] then Ms. Cauthen‟s 
total lung capacity percent predicted calculation would be 
60%.”  (Id. at 811.)   
 
Dr. Fortin also asserted that comparing an individual‟s 
lung capacity with the average capacity of persons having a 
similar demographic profile is important but not 
determinative in diagnosing PPH.  “Cardiologists,” she 
assured the District Court, “know about the limitations of the 
percent predicted calculation on a [PFT] and must rely on 
other methods in order to determine a specific patient‟s true 
total lung capacity, such as radiology studies and an exam of 
 9 
 
the patient‟s body habitus.”  (Id. at 810.)  In fact, Dr. Fortin 
claimed, “whether [Ms. Cauthen‟s] total lung capacity percent 
predicted calculation is 56% or 60% is clinically irrelevant” 
(id.), and “Ms. Cauthen‟s diet drug use was the cause of her 
[PPH]” (id. at 811).  Without further explanation, Dr. Fortin 
declared that, “[b]ased upon [her] review of the April 28, 
2009 Pulmonary Function Test and other objective tests,”3 
she had “ruled out any restrictive lung disease as a cause of 
Ms. Cauthen‟s [PPH].”  (Id.) 
 
Unconvinced, the District Court held that the Cauthens 
had not produced a PFT that supported their claim that Ms. 
Cauthen “does not have greater than mild restrictive lung 
disease,” as required by § I.46.a(2)(c) of the Settlement 
Agreement.  (Id. at 7.)  Dr. Fortin‟s declaration did not alter 
the Court‟s conclusion for two reasons.  First, the doctor 
acknowledged that Ms. Cauthen‟s only PFT demonstrated 
that she has a total lung capacity of only 56 percent of 
predicted at rest.  Ms. Cauthen thus did not meet the 
definition of PPH provided in § I.46.a(2)(c).  Second, the 
Settlement Agreement requires class members who wish to 
make a claim related to PPH to establish, “through a 
pulmonary function test only, the absence of greater than mild 
restrictive lung disease.”  (Id. at 6.).  Because Dr. Fortin‟s 
declaration is not the type of medical record contemplated in 
the Settlement Agreement as sufficient to establish a PPH 
claim, the Court held that it was not relevant to determining 
whether Ms. Cauthen satisfies § I.46.a(2)(c). 
 
                                              
3
 Dr. Fortin did not explain what those tests were or 
how they led her to her ultimate diagnosis. 
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The District Court accordingly entered PTO No. 8753 
granting Wyeth‟s motion and enjoining the Cauthens from 
prosecuting their lawsuit in state court.  The Cauthens then 
filed this timely appeal.   
 
II. Discussion
4
 
 
On appeal, the Cauthens argue that the District Court 
erred in two general ways.  First, they claim that the District 
Court misunderstood Dr. Fortin‟s declaration and that her 
declaration demonstrates that Ms. Cauthen in fact has PPH 
that was caused by her use of the diet drugs and not by mild 
restrictive lung disease.  Second, they argue in the alternative 
that, even if Ms. Cauthen does not meet the technical 
definition of PPH provided by the Settlement Agreement, the 
District Court should have reformed the Settlement 
Agreement, given changes in diagnostic capabilities that have 
rendered obsolete the requirement that a putative plaintiff 
                                              
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C §§ 1332 and 1407.  The District Court‟s order directing 
the Cauthens to dismiss their complaint in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is an injunction, and 
we therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  
We apply “plenary review to a district court‟s construction of 
settlement agreements,” but we review any underlying factual 
findings for clear error.  Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 
F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002); cf. In re Cendant Corp. Prides 
Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[C]ontract 
construction, that is, the legal operation of the contract, is a 
question of law mandating plenary review,” while “contract 
interpretation is a question of fact, and review is according to 
the clearly erroneous standard.”).   
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demonstrate lung capacity greater than 60 percent of 
predicted at rest. 
 
A. The Effect of Dr. Fortin’s Declaration 
 
Settlement agreements are interpreted according to 
“basic contract principles.”  In re Cendant Corp. Prides 
Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2000).  When the terms of a 
contract are clear and unambiguous, its meaning “must be 
determined from the four corners of the contract.”  Glenn 
Distribs. Corp. v. Carlisle Plastics, Inc., 297 F.3d 294, 300 
(3d Cir. 2002); see also Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott 
Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 587 (3d Cir. 2009) (“When the words are 
clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be 
determined from the express language of the agreement.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  In contrast, “if the 
written contract is ambiguous, a court may look to extrinsic 
evidence to resolve the ambiguity and determine the intent of 
the parties.”  Glenn Distribs., 297 F.3d at 300.  A contract 
provision is ambiguous under Pennsylvania law
5
 
 
if, and only if, it is reasonably or fairly 
susceptible of different constructions and is 
capable of being understood in more senses 
than one and is obscure in meaning through 
indefiniteness of expression or has a double 
meaning.  A contract is not ambiguous if the 
court can determine its meaning without any 
guide other than a knowledge of the simple 
                                              
5
 The parties agree that Pennsylvania law controls this 
issue.  (See Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 29 (citing 
Pennsylvania contract law); Appellee‟s Br. at 13 (same).) 
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facts on which, from the nature of the language 
in general, its meaning depends; and a contract 
is not rendered ambiguous by the mere fact that 
the parties do not agree on the proper 
construction. 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 
604, 614 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Under those standards, we cannot credit the Cauthens‟ 
arguments that Dr. Fortin‟s declaration either supplanted the 
requirements of the Settlement Agreement or otherwise 
satisfied them. 
 
First, the Cauthens contend that, because a board 
certified cardiologist “determined that Ms. Cauthen‟s PPH is 
not related to … restrictive lung disease,” Ms. Cauthen “has 
the right to make a claim against [Wyeth] for PPH under the 
definition of PPH in the Settlement Agreement” (Appellants‟ 
Opening Br. at 27), notwithstanding that her sole PFT showed 
her total lung capacity to be less than 60 percent of predicted 
at rest.  Specifically, the Cauthens point to Dr. Fortin‟s 
statements that “whether [Ms. Cauthen‟s] total lung capacity 
percent calculation is 56% or 60% is clinically irrelevant” 
(App. at 810), and that, “to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty[,] … Ms. Cauthen‟s diet drug use was the cause of 
her primary pulmonary hypertension.” (Id. at 811.)  
According to their argument, the District Court should have 
disregarded the requirements of the Settlement Agreement 
because a physician unilaterally declared that Ms. Cauthen 
has PPH that was caused by the diet drugs and not restrictive 
lung disease. 
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The Settlement Agreement, however, clearly and 
unambiguously states that a putative PPH plaintiff must 
demonstrate, through a PFT, that her total lung capacity is 
greater than 60 percent of predicted at rest.  That is the only 
way, under the specific terms of that agreement, to rule out 
“greater than mild restrictive lung disease” as a cause of PPH.  
Ms. Cauthen produced only one PFT, which showed that her 
lung capacity was only 56 percent of predicted at rest.  Her 
physician‟s confident assertion that Ms. Cauthen‟s PPH was 
caused by the diet drugs is therefore irrelevant in the face of 
the Settlement Agreement, which requires a showing that a 
putative plaintiff‟s lung capacity is greater than 60 percent of 
predicted at rest. 
 
Second, the Cauthens argue that Dr. Fortin‟s 
declaration is not meant to replace the requirements of 
§ I.46.a(2)(c), but rather that the declaration is a “medical 
record” that confirms the absence of greater than mild 
restrictive lung disease.  (See Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 25 
(when considered in light of Dr. Fortin‟s declaration, “Ms. 
Cauthen has presented a pulmonary function test to 
demonstrate that she has PPH in accord with the 
settlement”).)  Dr. Fortin‟s declaration, they contend, 
“demonstrates a lung capacity of at least 60% when the 5.37 
total lung volume … is even slightly reduced to reflect the 
Plaintiff‟s true lung capacity in the algorithmic formula used 
to calculate lung function.”  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 25-
26.)  The District Court therefore erred, the Cauthens argue, 
when it did not interpret the declaration to mean that Ms. 
Cauthen‟s percentage of lung capacity predicted at rest was 
actually greater than 60 percent, or, at least, a jury should be 
given the chance to so conclude. 
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Even if the Settlement Agreement could be read to 
allow Dr. Fortin‟s declaration to be an adequate substitute for 
or adjunct to a PFT, however, the Cauthens have overstated 
Dr. Fortin‟s position.  She never said that Ms. Cauthen‟s lung 
capacity is actually greater than 60 percent of predicted at 
rest, only that it cannot be known “what the true reference 
value for Ms. Cauthen should be.”  (App. at 810.)  
Accordingly, the Cauthens cannot credibly say that Dr. 
Fortin‟s declaration establishes that Ms. Cauthen‟s lung 
capacity is greater than 60 percent.
6
  The District Court 
                                              
6
 The Cauthens contend that this case should be 
governed by PTO No. 3699, a case in which the District 
Court considered and accepted a medical expert‟s declaration 
as a means of satisfying a separate provision of the Settlement 
Agreement.  There, the District Court interpreted a provision 
of the PPH exception that requires a putative plaintiff to 
produce “a diagnosis based on examinations and clinical 
findings … by cardiac catheterization” that the plaintiff‟s 
“normal pulmonary artery wedge pressure” is less than or 
equal to 15 mm Hg.  (App. at 42.10 (Settlement Agreement, 
§ I.46.a(1)(a)).)  The putative plaintiff produced a “Cardiac 
Catheterization Report” showing a wedge pressure range of 
14 to 16 mm Hg.  (App. at 14.)  Because the report straddled 
the range of the PPH exception, the District Court considered 
a declaration by the plaintiff‟s medical expert who reviewed 
the cardiac catheterization report and opined that the 
plaintiff‟s “wedge pressure [was] 14 mm Hg” and thus fell 
under the wedge pressure requirement.  (App. at 14.)  Based 
on that declaration, the Court found that the plaintiff satisfied 
the PPH exception and declined to enjoin his claims. 
The facts of PTO No. 3699 are much different than 
those of this case.  Whereas the results of the cardiac 
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therefore did not err in concluding that the Settlement 
Agreement unambiguously requires a showing through a PFT 
that a putative plaintiff‟s lung capacity is greater than 60 
percent of predicted at rest and that Dr. Fortin‟s declaration 
did not provide that showing.
7
 
                                                                                                     
catheterization report in PTO No. 3699 spanned the threshold 
wedge pressure value required by the Settlement Agreement, 
hindering the District Court‟s ability to determine whether the 
putative plaintiff‟s pressure fell outside the PPH exception 
(greater than 15 mm Hg), or within it (less than or equal to 15 
mm Hg), Ms. Cauthen‟s PFT unambiguously falls short of the 
PPH exception embodied in § I.46.a(2)(c). The District Court 
did not need the assistance of a medical expert to understand 
that a lung capacity percentage that is less than 60 percent of 
predicted at rest falls outside the exception. 
7
 The Cauthens also argue that the District Court 
should have allowed a jury to consider Dr. Fortin‟s 
declaration under rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
They assert that because Dr. Fortin is unquestionably an 
expert in the field of cardiac medicine, her opinion “would be 
admissible in a court of law” (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 37), 
and because her opinion would be admissible, it would “[b]y 
definition … have a reasonable medical basis in fact.”  (Id.)  
The District Court accordingly exceeded its authority as a 
gatekeeper, they argue, by rejecting Dr. Fortin‟s expert 
opinion as “evidence that could not be considered under the 
strictures of the Settlement Agreement.”  (Id. at 38.) 
But the Cauthens have not established the 
requirements of rule 702.  First, Dr. Fortin‟s specialized 
medical knowledge, as embodied in her declaration, would 
not “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
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determine a fact in issue.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702(a).  To 
determine whether a declaration is helpful, this Court looks to 
the “„proffered connection between the scientific research or 
test result to be presented and particular disputed factual 
issues in the case.‟”  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 
F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 
(1993) (adopting Downing‟s connection requirement).  A 
court “must examine the expert‟s conclusions in order to 
determine whether they could reliably flow from the facts 
known to the expert and methodology used.”  Oddi v. Ford 
Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Even if a party proffers expert 
testimony based on scientific knowledge, “„[a] court may 
conclude that there is simply too great a gap between the data 
and the opinion proffered.‟”  Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).  “Rule 702‟s „helpfulness‟ 
standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent 
inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”  In re Paoli, 35 
F.3d at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Dr. Fortin‟s declaration did not conclude that Ms. 
Cauthen‟s total lung capacity is greater than 60 percent of 
predicted at rest.  She asserted only that Ms. Cauthen‟s lung 
capacity percentage cannot be determined because “we just 
do not know conclusively what the true reference value for 
Ms. Cauthen should be.”  (App. at 810.)  That cannot help the 
trier of fact reach the necessary conclusion that Ms. 
Cauthen‟s total lung capacity, demonstrated by a PFT to be 
3.03 liters, is greater than 60 percent of predicted at rest.  At 
best, Dr. Fortin‟s declaration would provide evidence that Ms. 
Cauthen‟s total lung capacity predicted at rest might not be 56 
 17 
 
B. The Cauthens’ Reformation Argument 
In the alternative, the Cauthens contend that the 
District Court, which “retains a special responsibility to see to 
the administration of justice” in a class action settlement 
(Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 35 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), should have reformed the Settlement Agreement.  
Although they never sought reformation of the Settlement 
Agreement before the District Court, they now argue that the 
Court should have reformed the Settlement Agreement 
because diagnostic procedures for PFTs have changed.  They 
claim support for that argument in the following statement in 
Dr. Fortin‟s declaration: 
 
Automated spirometry systems usually have 
built-in software that can generate a preliminary 
interpretation, especially for spirometry.  
Today, most clinical pulmonary function testing 
laboratories use a microprocessor-driven 
pneumotachometer to measure air flow directly 
and then to mathematically derive volume.  
These pre-programmed values are based upon 
averages for persons of similar height, weight, 
age, ethnicity, etc. 
                                                                                                     
percent.  But a trier of fact could not use the declaration to 
conclude that Ms. Cauthen‟s total lung capacity is actually 
greater than 60 percent, and Dr. Fortin failed entirely to 
provide the “scientific connection” needed to bridge the gap 
between a percentage of lung capacity that falls below 60 
percent and one that does not.  Accordingly, Dr. Fortin‟s 
declaration is not an expert opinion that could be “helpful” to 
a trier of fact, even if there were a fact question. 
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(App. at 809.)  Placing emphasis on the word “today,” the 
Cauthens interpret that statement to mean that “on the modern 
pneumotachometers used at the present time, pre-
programmed algorithms measure air flow directly and then 
mathematically derive volume, precluding manual 
adjustments to the algorithms that were permitted on the older 
machines in use when the Settlement Agreement was 
negotiated and entered.”  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 23-24.)  
Essentially, the Cauthens argue that modern  diagnostic 
instruments are cause for reformation of the agreement. 
 
Because they did not raise that argument below, it is 
waived.  “It is axiomatic that arguments asserted for the first 
time on appeal are deemed to be waived and consequently are 
not susceptible to review in this Court absent exceptional 
circumstances.”  Tri-M Grp., L.L.C. v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 
416 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  That 
“general rule serves several important judicial interests,” 
including “protecting litigants from unfair surprise; 
promoting the finality of judgments and conserving judicial 
resources; … preventing district courts from being reversed 
on grounds that were never urged or argued before them,” id. 
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted), “ensuring 
that the necessary evidentiary development occurs in the trial 
court, and preventing surprise to the parties when a case is 
decided on some basis on which they have not presented 
argument,” Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 
835 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
It is true that the waiver rule “is one of discretion 
rather than jurisdiction, and it may be relaxed whenever the 
public interest so warrants.”  Id. at 834-35 (citation, 
alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).  “[W]e will 
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still address arguments raised for the first time on appeal in 
exceptional circumstances,” and we retain the discretion, 
“exercised on the facts of individual cases,” to determine 
“what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first 
time on appeal.”  Tri-M Grp., 638 F.3d at 416 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  But there are no exceptional 
circumstances in this case that would permit us to ignore the 
waiver rule.  “The waiver rule applies with greatest force 
where the timely raising of the issue would have permitted 
the parties to develop a factual record.”  Barefoot Architect, 
632 F.3d at 835.  The parties did not develop in the District 
Court the arguments in favor and against reformation, and 
that Court was not allowed to perform its vital function of 
developing a complete factual record on the relevant changes, 
if any, in diagnostic technology and procedures.  Without the 
aid of factual development by the District Court, we cannot 
adequately evaluate the merit of Dr. Fortin‟s assertion that 
diagnostic technologies have changed to such a degree that 
reformation is called for.
8
 
                                              
8
 Even in the absence of a waiver, it appears that the 
Cauthens would have difficulty with the merits of their 
argument.  While a district court retains “general equitable 
power to modify the terms of a class action settlement,” In re 
Cendant, 233 F.3d at 194, when the plaintiff demonstrates 
that there has been “a significant change either in factual 
conditions or in law,” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 
502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992), Dr. Fortin‟s declaration alone 
provides little proof that diagnostic procedures have indeed 
changed to the degree that reformation is warranted.  Dr. 
Fortin said that “[t]oday, most … laboratories use a 
microprocessor-driven pneumotachometer.”  (App. at 809.)  
She did not, however, explain how diagnostic procedures 
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III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision 
of the District Court. 
                                                                                                     
were different in the past or why the recent changes create the 
need to reform the Settlement Agreement.  
